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In this paper we survey the main findings of the literature on the macro-
-economic (dis)advantages of flexible exchange rates in the emerging mar-
ket economies focusing on the option of dollarization/euroization. We also
discuss transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe in this context.
After several financial crises in the 1990s, the issue of the appropriate ex-
change rate choice has been reduced to favoring flexible exchange rates or
dollarization. Theissue is far from resolved and opinions vary greatly across
the entire spectrum of possible exchange rate regimes.
We focus on the recent literature emphasizing the costs of flexible ex-
change rate regimes; nevertheless we also attempt to consider the costs of
other regimes. In the beginning, we provide general argument for the choice
of the exchange rate regime, as set up in the optimum currency area (OCA)
theory. Further, we discuss the limitations of the OCA theory in analyzing
the choice of the exchange rate regime in emerging market economies. Typi-
cally, these countries have a high share of their assets and liabilities de-
nominated in foreign currencies. Moreover, short track records, the poli-
tical environment and the size of the economy, from time to time causes 
the OCA theory to yield biased advice.
Next, we examine whether the countries, which adopt a particular regime
really maintain that regime, investigating for example whether the offi-
cially adopted flexible exchange rate regime is in fact flexible? If not, what
consequently makes the pro-claimed exchange rate regime different from
the actual exchange rate regime? We also describe the differences between
Central and Eastern European transition countries and other emerging
market economies under the option of abandoning its own currency as a le-
gal tender. There are several factors that make them different from theother
emerging markets. In particular, we present the costs and benefits of adopt-
ing the euro and unilateral euroization.
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(c02hor01@student.ceu.hu). I thank Jan Frait, Július Horváth, Lubo‰ Komárek, George Ko-
pits and the anonymous referees of the journal “Finance a uver” for valuable comments. How-
ever, the responsibility for omissions and errors is solely mine.
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the conclusion that no single exchange rate regime is right for all coun-
tries or at all times. However, nowadays there are some arguments that
the benefits of the floating exchange rate regimes are rather limited espe-
cially for emerging market economies as well as for some transition coun-
tries.
2. Some General Optimum Currency Area Considerations
The choice of the exchange rate regime and the process of its decision-
-making is a complex matter. In the emerging market economies this is even
more intricate due to their specific economic situation. Generally, the choice
of the exchange rate regime considers various structural characteristics of
the country, its policy goals as well as timing. Usually, the literature dis-
tinguishes several characteristics: symmetry of shocks, trade intensity,
openness, diversification of production, factor mobility, employee skills, bud-
get mechanism, financial integration, inflation, price and wage stickiness,
international coordination, product dissimilarity of export, international
monetary system and the size of the economy. Besides economic characte-
ristics, the broader institutional and political context should also be consi-
dered, including the credibility of the monetary policy and preferences in
economic policy and international coordination. Since it is not the aim of this
article to review OCAtheory, we state only several issues that shape the dis-
cussion about OCA.
2.1 Optimum Currency Area Theory
Friedman (1953) in his The Case for Flexible Exchange Rate argues
that economies should adopt more flexible exchange rate regimes since
this allows for faster and less costly adjustment to equilibrium.1 Since
price and wage stickiness prevails then it is reasonable to adjust nomi-
nally by depreciation under negative shock. The fixed exchange rate
regime in this case means that adjustments must go through the prices/
/wages channel.
Later on, Mundell (1961)2 challenges Friedman by demonstrating that if
the actual currency area is not an optimal currency area (OCA), the bene-
fits of flexible exchange rates are much lower than Friedman has assumed.
The difference between actual and optimal currency area limits the ability
of thefloating exchange rate regime to cushion theshock and bring thecoun-
tries back to equilibrium. However, when a particular country is an opti-
mal currency area3 and is not OCA with another country, it is advisable to
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1 On the other hand, it is also worth mentioning that Friedman states under which conditions
it is favorable for the country to fix its currency.
2 Mundell (1973) presents a rather different model. He argues how implementing common cur-
rency eliminates uncertainty in the development of the exchange rate and causes assets to be
more effectively diversified.
3 Whatever the difficulty might arise in defining such area.
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tries do not form OCA, we basically mean that they are likely to face sub-
stantial asymmetric shocks or alternatively theability to adjust under these
shocks is considerably low. If such shocks occur, countries adjust nominally
by changing the price of their currency. The question of particular interest
is how likely the countries are to encounter the asymmetric shocks. If
the probability is rather low, they could be better off by fixing their cur-
rencies, because the costs of maintaining their own currency would not be
offset by the benefits of their autonomous monetary policy. Assessing
the above-mentioned structural characteristics of the economies is one way
for the possible answer to the proper choice of the exchange rate regime.
Recent OCA literature introduces “the endogenous hypothesis” (Frankel
– Rose, 1998). This hypothesis in contrast to the previous literature says
that countries, even if they are not OCA ex ante, they might be ex post.
An adoption of a common currency significantly encourages trade. Stronger
trade linkages cause the national business cycle to be correlated; that is
the probability of asymmetric shock declines.4 Obviously, the crucial issue
for policy-makers is to assess the strength of this mechanism in practice.
2.2 Limitations of Traditional OCA Theory
On the other hand, there are also drawbacks of the OCA theory in ana-
lyzing the emerging market economy choice of the exchange rate regime.
Aside from its low short-run operational precision for the decision-making
of authorities, it does not say a lot about financial issues. Given the tech-
nological progress and low controls on capital movements, the volume of
trade on financial markets becomes much bigger than the commodity trade.
Moreover, financial markets are more volatile, especially in emerging
economies due to potentially higher overall uncertainty and the economic
size of the countries. Financial fragility is thus crucial in shaping the de-
velopment of exchange rates.5 OCA literature typically ignores the initial
conditions of the emerging market economies such as dollarization and in-
stitutions connected to this issue (Calvo, 2002).
Apart from the general optimum currency area theory, recent literature
(e.g. Calvo – Reinhart, 2002), (Hausmann, 2001) has identified several is-
sues that have a strong impact on the choice and the actual behavior of
the exchange rate, especially in the emerging market economies. We will
discuss them in turn in the following sections.
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4 On the other hand, Barro and Tenreyro (2003) find that common currency decreases co-move-
ments of shocks to real GDP; i.e. economic specialization increases with the adoption of com-
mon currency.
5 E.g. Calvo (2002, p. 394) and Hausmann (2001, p. 3) both share this view. Moreover, Calvo
(2002, p. 394) mentions that well-known book on monetary integration by Paul De Grauwe
(1997): “does not contain the word ‘financial’” in the Subject index. However, there are empiri-
cal studies about OCA theory by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (e.g. 1998) that attempt to connect
financial issues and OCA theory. There are also other delicate issues about the OCA theory. Fa-
tas (1998) emphasizes empirical evidence on significant asymmetric shocks within the countries
while these countries perform well in terms of income growth even with the lack of exchange
rate mechanisms.
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Over the last two or three decades, more and more developing6 countries
have adopted a floating exchange rate regime as reported in Table 1. Some
caution has to be taken to argue that floating exchange rate regimes are
thus preferable for these economies. Namely, the adopted exchange rate
regime does not have to correspond to the actual behavior of the exchange
rate.
For example, it makes a great difference whether the anchor currencies
float against each other or are pegged. It was much more difficult to defend
pegged regimes after the break-up of the Bretton Woods system when
the DEM started floating against the USD. Pegging to one of these cur-
rencies floating against the other and vice versa. This significantly jeopar-
dized the efforts to stabilize exchange rates. The choice to introduce float-
ing between two major currencies only, made many others follow them.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997, p. 186) put it right: “Actual exchange rate
behavior may in fact convey more information about underlying economic
determinants than the putative exchange rate regime.” These authors also
provide empirical evidence on the importance of considering the interna-
tional monetary system for exchange rate behavior. Among others, Haus-
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1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 1998
Pegged 86 75 67 57 45 41
US dollar 42 32 25 19 15 12
French franc 13 12 11 11 11 9
Other 7 4 4 3 4 8
SDR 12 13 8 5 2 3
Composite 12 14 18 20 14 9
Limited flexibility 3 10 5 4 3 2
Single 3 10 5 4 3 2
Cooperative – – – – – –
More flexible 11 15 28 39 52 57
Set to indicators 6 3 4 4 2 –
Managed floating 4 9 13 16 21 33
Independently floating 1 4 11 19 29 24
Number of countries 100 113 119 123 123 159
TABLE 1 Developing Countries: Officially Reported Exchange Rate Arrangements
Source: (Larrain – Velasco, 2002). Data, except last row, are in percents of total.
6 In the article, we concentrate on the emerging market economies that are narrower set of coun-
tries in comparison to developing countries. Some developing countries are not market
economies, even if the definition of emerging market economy is a manner of degree. By emerg-
ing market economies the authors usually mean most of the countries of Latin America, Eas-
tern Europe and Far East. These countries are characterized inter alia by openness of capital
account, exposure to real shocks, investor sentiment, insufficiently developed institutions, po-
licy weaknesses and low credibility. However, the arguments put forward may be generalized
to developing countries, to a certain extent.
s_252_266  25.5.2004  17:45  Stránka 255mann, Panizza and Stein (2001) as well as Calvo and Reinhart (2002) show
that the emerging market economies even if they de jure float, they in fact
fear floating and heavily try to stabilize the development of the exchange
rate.
Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2001) present an empirical study on
the explicability of exchange rate flexibility by the lack of ability to borrow
in own currency and exchange rate pass-through. The authors also calcu-
late the index of exchange rate flexibility. The results are clear-cut. Emerg-
ing market economies hold several times greater international reserves
(normalized by M2) than developed countries. Yet they provide evidence
that emerging market economies heavily intervene in the foreign exchange
market. The calculated exchange rate flexibility index7 shows that flexibi-
lity of emerging market economies is lower than for smaller and medium-
-sized industrial economies and much lower than for the USA, Japan and
Germany. In conclusion, this study suggests that the emerging market
economies despite adopting floating exchange rate regimes do not float a lot
anyway. In a similar manner, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) show the evidence
of limited exchange rate flexibility.
4. Why Emerging Market Economies in Fact Do Not Float?
Encountering large discrepancies between theofficial and actual exchange
rate management, one can naturally ask for the reason that the country
demonstrates such behavior. Therefore in this section, we discuss thecauses
why these countries are likely to fear floating.
4.1 Credibility-Inflation Framework
Emerging market economies usually lack the credibility of their mone-
tary policy as compared to developed countries. This lack of credibility is
often connected to the misuse of monetary policy. As a result, the countries
with lower credibility are likely to suffer higher equilibrium inflation.
The private sector anticipates this behavior and then it is more costly for
monetary authorities to disinflate the economy and to regain the credibi-
lity.8 One way to escape this is to import credibility by introducing officially
hard currency (or dollarization) or to eliminate the abuse of the monetary
policy (for example, by an independent central bank with inflation target-
ing or a well-functioning currency board). The practical issue is how quickly
these alternative mechanisms work. It seems reasonable that the currency
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7 At first, they consider more proxies on assessing exchange rate flexibility. In the calculation
of the indices they use the data on the international reserves, money supply, exchange rate de-
preciation and interest rates and then by the factor analysis set up the overall exchange rate
flexibility index.
8 In this sense, Edwards (1993) provides evidence that the exchange rate regime significantly
affects the level of inflation. His results support the view that developing economies with a fixed
exchange rate regime experienced lower inflation during the 1980s. On the other hand, Larrain
and Velasco (2002) provide survey of the studies of the same issue and document that once
money growth variable is introduced, the effect of the fixed exchange rate regime on inflation
rate is much lower.
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abandoning are higher) can considerably speed up the process of disinfla-
tion at reasonably low costs.
On the other hand, Larrain and Velasco (2002, p. 365) points out that
the way to escape the inflation-credibility problem is: “Adoption of an in-
flation target as the main anchor for monetary policy, coupled with a mone-
tary policy reaction function that – aside from reacting to output gaps and
other determinants of the inflation rate – reacts also partially to movements
in thenominal exchange rate.” There are several economies capable of main-
taining both a floating exchange rate and single-digit inflation, such as
Colombia or Chile in the 1990s.
Low credibility is not only problematic for inflation itself. Low credibility
through inflationary expectations also causes high interest rates. Emerg-
ing economies often have high government debt and high interest rates (and
swings in these rates) make it harder to service their debt. If the stock of
debt is sufficiently high, little room remains for fiscal policy. Dollarization
would likely import thecredibility and reduce interest rates due to theelimi-
nation of currency risk as well.
In contrast to the inflation-credibility problem, Hausmann (2001, p. 8)
emphasizes: “The new discussion about exchange rates in emerging mar-
kets has not been prompted by concerns over inflation... (Nor.... over trade
and growth).” Instead, financial fragility experienced by the emerging eco-
nomy shapes thediscussion on thechoice of theexchange rate arrangements,
according to Hausmann. International capital flows were important for
these fragilities and it is a question of particular interest whether some ar-
rangements help in creating these fragilities. Moreover, inflation declined
in the 1990s across all exchange rate regimes.
4.2 Exchange Rates and Insulation from External Shocks
Concerns that emerging market economies with a flexible exchange rate
do not exhibit lower interest rate volatility, lead to the issue whether float-
ing rates provide insulation from external shocks. In principle, deprecia-
tion (or also appreciation) could insulate the economy from external shocks.
However, depreciation works only if it is a surprise for the public. Other-
wise, when it is anticipated, nominal depreciation stays without real effects.
This means that the depreciation would be equipped with inflationary ten-
dencies and would not significantly increase the competitiveness of the ex-
port.
Whether nominal depreciation will lead to real depreciation depends on
the level of pass-through from depreciation to prices.9 In this respect, it is
interesting to mention that depreciation can even lead to the increase of
real interest rates. Initially, depreciation causes nominal interest rates to
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9 Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2001) test whether higher passthrough in the economy is ac-
companied by lower degree of exchange rate flexibility. They find negative, but insignificant cor-
relation between pass-through and flexibility. They argue that the insignificant results might
be caused by the difficulty in constructing the proxy for the degree of pass-through.
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mann, Panizza and Stein, 2001). But this is accompanied by the increase
of prices due to wage indexation.10 Finally, nominal interest rates increase
and with some overshooting it is possible that the real interest rates are
even higher than originally. Hausmann et al. (1999) provide evidence for
Latin American countries in this case and finds that real interest rates do
not fall. Nevertheless, the degree of pass-through varies strongly across
the countries. Larrain and Velasco (2002, p. 375) mention that devaluation
in e.g. Korea and Brazil during the crisis was not accompanied by higher
inflation (contrary to Mexico in 1994). Aside from credibility dimension,
the level of competitiveness, and openness and the size of the economy also
matters for the degree of pass-through also.
4.3 Original Sin
Emerging market economies are reluctant to float for other reasons as
well. Given the fact that these countries borrow in foreign currency,11 there
is always risk arising from unexpected changes in the exchange rate that
their net foreign debt may worsen. In other words, firms and government
can face currency mismatch in their balance sheets because of their in-
ability (non-existence of such markets) to borrow abroad in domestic cur-
rency. Moreover, they are usually unable to borrow at home for a long
term. Borrowing for a short term at home is not a solution either. In this
case, maturity mismatches might arise. This means that firms/the govern-
ment is unable to roll over the debt due to the swings in the interest ra-
tes.
Then, in the case of shock to the economy, exchange rate movements (typi-
cally depreciation) cause currency mismatch for some companies. If the mo-
netary authority decides to increase the interest rate to prevent deprecia-
tion, then corporations are likely to encounter maturity mismatch. In li-
terature, this is called the devil’schoice. This choice is caused by what Haus-
mann (2001) calls an original sin. The hypothesis of original sin emphasizes
an incompleteness in financial markets, which prevents the domestic cur-
rency from being used to borrow abroad or to even borrow long term do-
mestically.
There are several causes of original sin. Net creditors are unwilling to let
the net borrowers manipulate the value of the currency. Clearly, there is
a strong moral hazard to devalue. When a median voter is a net borrower,
one may expect lower political pressure to keep the real value of domestic
currency assets in the country. There is also the ‘economies of scale’ argu-
ment. Little markets are illiquid and portfolio diversification makes sense
with ten, but not with one hundred currencies.
Original sin causes emerging economies to be exposed to self-fulfilling at-
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10 It depends on the price and wage setting in the economy. Devaluation increases the price of
imports. At the same time it is usual that trade unions consider the increase in the price of
the imports and are reluctant to lower the real wage for their members.
11 The effects of the dollarization of liabilities matter more with high debts.
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flows causing either a currency or a liquidity crisis.
Another issue of concern is that households partially save in the foreign
currency. Table 2 reports the ratio of foreign currency deposits to broad
money for selected emerging market economies. It makes little sense for
residents to save in domestic currency if the strength of the currency posi-
tively correlates with the output. Clearly, anyone would not want to have
her savings worth less, when they are most needed. Aizenman and Haus-
mann (2000) show that during a recession savings in the domestic currency
are worth less because of depreciation. Therefore Hausmann (2001, p. 11)
states: “With foreigners lending only in dollars and residents saving partly
in dollars, the supply of loanable funds to corporations will be heavily tilted
towards a foreign currency. Hence, currency mismatches can be quite sig-
nificant in a country with open capital accounts and original sin.”
This behavior makes countries likely to encounter a self-fulfilling cur-
rency crisis. Knowing that possible depreciation would cause defaults in
the economy12 can initiate an attack on the currency. Defaults are likely be-
cause of the currency mismatch. In an attempt to defend the currency by
raising interest rates or tightening money, the central bank would expose
the economy to a maturity mismatch.
One might argue that the domestic currency was overvalued and depre-
ciation is a natural way to the equilibrium. Depreciation would help to re-
store the external balance as well as increase borrowing because of lower
interest rates. However, for a partially dollarized economy the expansio-
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TABLE 2 Reported Ratios of Foreign Currency Deposits (FCD) Broad Money in Selected Count-
ries with IMF Arrangements
Source: www.imf.org, Occasional paper no. 171
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lance sheets. That is why, as Hausmann (2001) argues, countries suffering
original sin would find full dollarization attractive.13
4.4 Sudden Stops
An alternative argument to explain self-fulfilling crises is the model of
sudden stops by Calvo (1998). He explains how the reversal of capital in-
flow may lead to the disruption of the whole economy.14 Emerging market
economies often run current account deficits that allow them to maintain
higher income and consumption, as well as lower interest rates. Then if for
whatever reason inflow of the capital suddenly stopped, or even the flow re-
versed, plenty ofproblems for theemerging market economy occur. Domestic
demand would fall sharply. Interest rates would rise and worsen the ser-
vice of the debt. Meanwhile, tax revenues would decrease. At the corporate
level, borrowing would become harder, endangering the solvency of compa-
nies. The reason for a sudden stop is not only due to political tensions, but
also simply the expectation of the depreciation.
It is also important to stress the contagion effects as well. They arise due
to imperfect information. As a way to limit contagion effects, Calvo (2002)
considers the following reasons which might in turn lead to the choice to
fully dollarize: There are short track records. Thus emerging market
economies require more frequent monitoring and this consequently leads
to lower information gathering, since it is costly to monitor. The size of
emerging economies is small and if they pursue their own monetary policy,
it suggests that this monitoring is costly as well. The evolution of the level
of government intervention is unclear also. These reasons may cause emerg-
ing markets to seriously consider dollarization. Dollarization lowers cur-
rency as well as country risk. This in turn leads to better access to invest-
ment projects.
With the contemplation of full dollarization, one might argue that there
is no difference between currency board and full dollarization since the real
effects are the same. This view neglects the importance of credibility. Under
fully credible currency boards, there is indeed no difference. But the eco-
nomic agents understand that the costs to leave the currency board regime
are much lower then under full dollarization. 
4.5 Costs of Dollarization
So far, we have largely focused on the costs of flexible exchange rate
regimes, but there are also costs of the other corner solutions (pegged regi-
mes, dollarization), too. Let us touch upon those costs that relate to the OCA
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13 In this sense, de la Torre, Yeyati and Schmuckler (2002) argue that the official dollarization
in Argentina would probably prevent a run on the banks and the consequent collapse of the fi-
nancial system during the Argentinean crisis in 2001.
14 More generally, it does not have to be a reversal, capital stop or even sufficient slowing down
might suffice for a crisis.
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The main concern is asymmetric shocks. How will a fully dollarized coun-
try adjust when encountering an asymmetric shock? One can hardly ima-
gine an effective fiscal policy in the emerging market economies. Apart from
per se problems of fiscal policy, irresponsible short-run oriented fiscal po-
licy causes a lot of problems for these countries. One may also raise the is-
sue of the importance of political cycles in these policies. The prices and
wages are to a large extent downwardly inflexible as that may cause higher
unemployment (for example under shock this calls for a depreciation of
the real exchange rate). Resulting social tensions decrease the efficiency of
fiscal policy further. Of course, these are all empirical issues as dollariza-
tion also imposes some prudence for domestic authorities as well. Labor
markets usually do not serve as effective means of adjustment as well. An-
other issue is that if depreciation were important, dollarization might in-
crease the default risk of the corporate sector (Wojcik, 2000).
Calvo (2002) argues that devaluations in Latin America (with the excep-
tion of Brazil in 1999) have been contractionary. It seems that devaluations
are useless, especially under liability dollarization, contagion effects and
shocks coming from capital accounts. Indeed, exchange rate flexibility can-
not be an argument against dollarization.15
Another argument against dollarization (alternatively currency board) is
that these regimes do not posses the lender of the last resort (LOLR). Lar-
rain and Velasco (2002) argue that LOLR can enhance the stability of the fi-
nancial sector by allowing extra credit and decrease the probability of self-
-fulfilling bank runs. This might divert liquidity crisis and subsequent runs
on the banks. However, there are alternative ways to provide extra credit
when needed. Clearly, special stabilization funds or seignorage sharing
could do the job as well.16
According to Calvo (2002), the most serious threat is debt deflation.
Clearly, the debt might cause serious troubles when it is high, as it is often
the case for emerging market economies. Unanticipated collapse in prices
can eventually lead to many bankruptcies. Costly hedging might solve this
threat. 
In section 4, we have mainly argued for the benefits that may arise from
dollarization or currency board for emerging market economies while men-
tioning the costs as well. Nevertheless, it is a largely empirical issue, as to
how strong the various ‘benefits and costs’ factors are. The empirically 
oriented literature tends to give us some “average” evidence for these coun-
tries. Hence, the pros and cons may differ from country to country and must
be carefully analyzed in every individual case.
Moreover, one has to stress that it is empirically very difficult to analyze
the costs and benefits of exchange rate choice as the available theories do
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15 Moreover, Calvo (2002, p. 398) proposes that real exchange rate misalignments can be fixed
by commercial policy by imposing temporarily uniform import tariff-cum-export-subsidy policy.
De la Torre et al. (2002) proposed for Argentina so-called pesofication at the margin (dollar for
savings and peso – alternatively other domestic currency for transactions).
16 See Calvo (2002) for more on the substitute of LOLR or Rostowski (2002) for discussion about
these alternative ways under the unilateral euroization.
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gement) is also to a large extent a political issue.
5. A Digression on Transition Economies
Transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe are emerging mar-
ket economies as well. However, their economic environment is, to some ex-
tent, different from therest of theemerging market economies. Theprospect
of EU/EMU accession for some countries considerably eliminates a number
of problems other emerging market economies face. There is also a much
lower level of (unofficial) dollarization/euroization. On average, the level
tends to be higher in Balkan countries. The debt is not drastically high; to
the contrary, it is rather low in several countries. Hence, transition coun-
tries encounter different challenges in their exchange rate management.
Currently, if we focus on the accession countries, this is an optimal timing
of euro adoption and an optimal scenario of the adoption. In the spirit of
the paper, we largely focus on the costs and benefits of unilateral euroiza-
tion.17
Let us first briefly comment on the current economic development in tran-
sition economies. They are suffering current account deficits as a conse-
quence of high capital inflows.18 For many countries this deficit is higher
that 5 % of GDP. This exposes the countries to several threats such as capi-
tal stops; as mentioned above for emerging market economies in general.
Consumption smoothing, Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect, higher returns
on physical investment and the distortions on domestic capital markets
mainly cause this deficit (Rostowski, 2002). The deficit might eventually be
perceived as unsustainable and expose the country to a currency crisis and
subsequent economic recession. Clearly, one may ask whether the policy can
affect the current account deficit.
Economic policy is, to a large extent, ineffective. Increasing the interest
rate, the further deterioration of the current account is very much likely.
On the other hand, transition countries must fulfill Maastricht criterion
asking for low inflation. Thedecrease of interest rates might endanger meet-
ing the inflation criterion. Expansive fiscal policy stimulating the domestic
demand inevitably leads to the worsening of the current account deficit, too.
The only escape might be a restrictive fiscal policy unless government pru-
dence is not perceived as a positive signal for investors.
A possible solution, as proposed by Rostowski (e.g. 2002) might be uni-
lateral euroization. Technically, it is relatively simple and with sufficient
international reserves it would be possible to set up a special stabilization
fund to work as a substitute to the LOLR. The probable story would be
strengthening of investment due to the elimination of the currency risk as
well as lowering of interest rates. Clearly, there cannot be any nominal ap-
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17 See (Wojcik, 2000), (Rostowski, 2002) and (Horvath, 2003) among others on unilateral eu-
roization.
18 See (Begg et al., 2002) for an in-depth study on the sustainability of capital movements in
the transition economies.
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roization would strengthen fiscal accounts and promote greater financial
stability.
The adjustment under asymmetric shocks as well as other applicable OCA
considerations is discussed in the previous sections. Although most of
the empirical studies19 suggest that the OCA characteristics of the transi-
tion economies are roughly the same as those of the Eurozone members.
Hence, in the long run the probability of encountering these shocks is si-
milar among all the countries with the euro as their legal tender. Low eco-
nomic size and high trade linkages as well as similar productive structure
and commodity structure of exports suggest that the costs of euro adoption
in the transition economies should be rather low. Clearly, these arguments
fit the best Visegrad and Baltic countries, but much less do they fit the re-
maining transition economies.
Moreover, Habib (2002) provides empirical evidence on the inability of
flexible exchange rates to insulate the country from shocks for Poland, Hun-
gary and the Czech Republic with the data from period 1997–2001. He finds
that all these countries were significantly affected by the emerging market
risk premia. Volatility contagion coming from emerging market economies
plays a role, too. Moreover, Habib finds that floating exchange rates do not
considerably absorb the external shocks in the case of the Czech Republic.
Nevertheless, the findings about the role of exchange rate insulation may
change over time.
Recently, some studies have argued that the benefits of euroization out-
weigh its costs. Except Rostowskis’ (e.g. 2002) arguments for Polish unila-
teral euroization, Sulling (2002) provides the arguments for Estonia and
Gros (2002) considers ‘political economy’arguments and finds unilateral eu-
roization attractive for Balkan countries, too. Corricelli (2002) also consi-
ders early euroization desirable and argues that the corresponding benefits
will be greater if the euro is adopted simultaneously by the accession coun-
tries. Moreover, what concerns the frequently mentioned EU aversion to
unilateral euroization; Bratkowski and Rostowski (2002) as well as Nuti
(2002) find that there is no economic justification to this aversion. On
the other hand, Wojcik (2000) criticizes extensively the proposals for uni-
lateral euroization. Begg et al. (2002) argues that unilateral euroization is
less risky than the euro adoption under the current institutional arrange-
ments.
Nevertheless, costs are also associated with unilateral euroization.
Seignorage revenues would probably be lost (seignorage sharing would not
be likely). The countries would likely encounter problems with smooth ac-
cess to the euro money markets for domestic financial institutions. Money
supply growth would probably decelerate substantially (but not to Eurozone
levels due to high capital inflows; this growth depends on thecredit dynamics
in economy as well). Unilateral euroization, while obviously removing cur-
rency risk, could in fact increase the default risk of the firms due to non-ex-
istence of depreciation (Wojcik, 2000). Joining the EU in 2004, these coun-
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Thus, it would be a politically hazardous for these countries to unilaterally
euroize. Moreover, those countries that want to adopt the euro quickly may
do that in 2006–2007 via agreed institutional arrangements thus eliminat-
ing some of the drawbacks of unilateral euroization.20 Other arguments that
apply, not only to unilateral euroization but to euro adoption in general, is
the degree of flexibility of labor markets and the fiscal position; i.e. the is-
sues that mainly favor postponing Eurozone accession.
Nonetheless,euro adoption is most likely only aquestion of time for theap-
plicant countries. While unilateral euroization has some attractive economic
arguments, there are considerable drawbacks for the accession countries to
euroize unilaterally. However, this does not mean that for other transition
economies, such as the Balkan countries, the benefits from unilateral eu-
roization could not outweigh the costs.
6. Conclusion
This paper analyses the option of dollarization/euroization and attempts
to provide some arguments for the view that there are no one-size-fits-all
policies for the emerging market economies. This means (in the words of
J. Frankel) that no single exchange rate regime is right for all countries or
at all times as the optimum currency area literature suggests. The limita-
tions of the OCAtheory in examining the choice of the exchange rate regime
must be stressed. The OCA theory does not analyze financial issues, which
shapes the discussion about appropriate regimes in the emerging market
economies.
Nonetheless, examining various emerging market economies (by the ‘non-
-OCA theories’) there are several arguments undermining the benefits of
flexible exchange rate regimes. For many reasons, these countries fear float-
ing. There is weak evidence that these arrangements would insulate
the country from the external shocks. Interest rate volatility is not lower in
the countries maintaining a floating exchange rate regime. They suffer from
the incompleteness of financial markets; i.e. original sin, basically the in-
ability to borrow in the domestic currency. This exposes them to currency
and maturity mismatches. Given the high stock of debt in some emerging
market economies, these mismatches are a serious threat, which leads to
currency crises and subsequently undermines the economic growth.
Dollarization might help these countries to solve at least some of their
problems. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the arguments fa-
voring dollarization are sensitive to the initial conditions. If the conditions
in the emerging market economies are such as described in the text (origi-
nal sin, financial fragility, high stock of debt, short track records etc.), dol-
larization might be the right option.
There are arguments for euroization for the transition countries as well.
The potentially unsustainable current account deficits and examination of
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transition countries as well. However, unilateral euroization bears strong
drawbacks for the countries becoming EU members in the near future. Also,
non-exchange rate adjusting mechanisms must be considered since for some
countries labor markets are not flexible and there is also a need for fiscal
consolidation.
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Is Dollarization the Right Option?
A Survey of Disadvantages of Flexible Exchange Rates 
in Emerging Market Economies
Roman HORVÁTH – MA student, Economics Department, Central European University, Budapest
(c02hor01@student.ceu.hu)
This paper focuses on the option of dollarization or euroization for emerging-mar-
ket economies. There are no “one-size-fits-all” exchange-rate policies for emerging-
-market economies; however, there are macroeconomic disadvantages associated
with flexible exchange-rate regimes in such economies. Similarly, the timing of euro
adoption in EU accession countries is a complex matter as well. The paper compares
the costs and benefits of euro adoption, in particular to unilateral euroization.
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